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certiorari, but the review is limited solely to the question of whether the
participation of a federal Court of Claims judge in the ruling by the Second
Circuit invalidates that ruling.38 If the Supreme Court should invalidate
the proceeding, then a retrial is possible, and the court can reexplore the
whole legal jungle created by Glidden, in which industry, its contracts with
labor, and the courts are deeply entangled. But if the Supreme Court
sustains Judge Madden's participation, the interpretation of the Second
Circuit will stand39—that seniority rights to a job, provided for in a
contract, and not limited to any specific time or place therein, exist
anywhere the employer may be in business, unless waived by the employee
or bargained away by his union.
DAVID H. KRAVETZ
Negotiable Instruments—Rights of Employer's Fidelity Insurer Against
Collecting Bank on Employees Unauthorized Endorsement.—Aetna
Car. E.1 Sur. Co. v. Lindell Trust Co.1—A salesman of the insured, with no
authority to endorse checks payable to his employer, endorsed and cashed
three checks at the defendant Trust Company which, in turn, collected the
amounts of the checks from the drawee bank. Upon learning of the
fraudulent transaction, the insured demanded of the Trust Company
reimbursement of the total amount of the three checks. The demand was
refused, whereupon the insured made a claim against the insurer, Aetna
Casualty & Surety Company. The claim was satisfied and, in return, the
insured assigned all its right, title, and interest in and to any claims it may
have against the Trust Company to Aetna. Aetna brought suit against the
Trust Company allegedly for money had and received. The trial court
rendered judgment for the defendant, holding that it would be inconsistent
to allow Aetna to recover after it had paid the insured on its fidelity bond.
In further support of the judgment, the trial court found that Aetna's right
to recover was based upon and limited by the equitable doctrine of subroga-
tion. The Court of Appeals reversed. HELD: (1) Insured did not, by
demanding and receiving payment from the insurer, make such election as
to preclude the insurer from asserting its subrogation right against the
the "runaway" shop. Sidele Fashions, Inc., 36 L.A. 1364 (1961); Address—O—Mat,
Inc., 36 L.A. 1074 (1961). But see U.S. Steel Corp., 36 L.A. 940 (1961).
38 The issue raised grows out of the contention that the United States Court of
Appeals is a constitutional tribunal, and the United States Court of Claims is a legis-
lative body. The Supreme Court has previously been asked to settle this point as to all
the statutory federal courts involved, and the grant of review for this specific purpose
means it is ready to do so. If it should decide with the Glidden lawyers that the act
of Congress of 1953 attempted unconstitutionally to repudiate the classification (by the
Supreme Court in Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 1933), that the Court of Claims
was a legislative and not a constitutional court, then the Second Circuit's ruling would be
vitiated by Judge Madden's participation.
30 "Should the Supreme Court leave this situation standing, however, it can be
corrected by Congress since the grounding of the appeals court decision appears to be in
equity and the implications found in long service, not in the Constitution of the United
States." Krock, op. cit. supra note 23, at 20.
1- 348 S.W.2d 558 (Mo. App. 1961).
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bank; (2) insurer's right to recover is not limited by the equitable doctrine
of subrogation, but even if so limited, superior equities are in favor of the
plaintiff.
In granting relief to the insurer-subrogee, the Missouri court set out
numerous principles, both legal and equitable, for its decision. The court
first concluded that the substance of the pleading is controlling, and,
therefore, notwithstanding that in form the action was for money had
and received, the real theory was in tort for conversion. It went on to
say that it makes little difference whether the action is for money had and
received or for conversion, even though it distinguished cases cited in
support of the defendant's argument that election by the insured to receive
payment from the insurer precluded the latter from asserting its subro-
gation claim on the ground that in such cases the actions were for
money had and received against a drawee bank rather than in tort for
conversion against a collecting bank? In any case, according to the court,
the cause of action was not extinguished by payment from the insurer. The
assignment of the cause of action was deemed to be a valid transfer
recognized at law and unencumbered by equitable principles. Finally, in
what appears to be an effort to protect the decision in the event of appeal,
the court held that although the insurer does not have the burden of
showing superior equities, the evidence sustains the burden, in that in fact
the insurer does possess superior equities.
At common law it is held that a bank, which collects checks endorsed
by an agent who has no authority, obtains no title thereto and is liable to
the true owner for the collection.3 It should be noted that under the
Uniform Commericial Code's recovery by the owner from a collecting bank,
who has in good faith and in accordance with reasonable commercial
standards paid the owner's money on an unauthorized endorsement, is
limited to the amount of proceeds remaining in the bank's possession.
Whether a payee can recover from a collecting bank no longer in possession
of the proceeds would depend therefore upon a deviation from reasonable
2 The court seems to agree, sub silentio, with the view promulgated in United
States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Fidelity Nat'l Bank, 232 Mo. App, 412, 109 S.W.2d 47
(1937), that the employer of one who without authority cashes a check at the
employer's depository bank may either demand payment of its money from the bank
on the theory that when the bank paid the holder of the check it paid out its own
money and not that of the employer, and thus is liable for money had and received or
affirm payment by the bank and pursue the employee or look to the insurer for
reimbursement of the loss occasioned by the employee's defalcation. Aetna was
distinguished by asserting that the insured's right in tort for conversion against
the collecting bank is distinct and independent from the right created by contract
against the insurer for losses caused by an untrustworthy employee.
3 George v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 19 Cal. App. 708, 267 Pac. 560 (1928) ;
National Union Bank v. Miller Rubber Co., 148 Md. 449, 129 All. 688 (1925); Strong
v. Missouri-Lincoln Trust Co. of St. Louis, 263 SM. 1038 (Mo. App. 1924); Central
Trust Co. v. Backsman, 50 Ohio App. 512, 198 N.E. 730 (1935); Bell-Wayland Co.
v. Bank of Sugden, 95 Okl. 67, 218 Pac. 705 (1923); Charleston Paint Co. v.
Exchange Bkg. & Trust Co., 129 S.C. 290, 123 S.E. 830 (1924) ; Labor Bank &
Trust Co. v. Adams, 23 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) ; California Stucco Co.
v. Marine Nat'l Bank, 148 Wash. 341, 268 Pac. 891 (1928).
4 UCC § 3-419.
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commercial standards Had the Code been controlling in Aetna, it is
doubtful that the defendant would have been liable. The view at common
law, however, emphasizes the duty of a bank, whether collecting or
drawee, to cash checks only according to the drawer's order, and, as
between it and an innocent payee, places absolute responsibility on the
former for its unauthorized payment. Thus, in cases where the employer
has fidelity insurance, he may look to four sources for reimbursement—the
insurer, the collecting bank, the drawee bank or the principal wrongdoer.
Where the employer has chosen to pursue the insurer for recovery, some
courts have held such election to be a ratification of payment on the check
which thereby extinguishes any cause of action against the banks involved.5
This theory has been effectively attacked and is now of doubtful con-
sequence.° It would seem that for the election of remedies doctrine
absolutely to preclude recovery from either bank after the insured has
been reimbursed by the insurer, legal recognition of the right against the
insurer must admit facts which negate the existence of any rights of the
insurer against the banks.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. ii. First Nat'l Bank in Dallas' effectively
nullified an earlier federal decisions by holding that the right to collect
from the surety is not inconsistent with the right to proceed against the
bank. In Liberty Mutual, the position was taken that the indemnity
policy does not insure the depositor against loss through acquistion by an
employee of the depositor's money, but instead insures the depositor
against loss sustained by reason of the dishonest acts of the employee.
It was pointed out that the risk insured against is the dishonest acts of the
employee and not a breach of duty on the part of the bank. Such reasoning
also lends support to the argument that a bank which is primarily liable
to the payee should not benefit from an insurance contract to which it has
not been a party.° The court in Aetna took a view similar to that expressed
in the Liberty Mutual, concluding that recovery by the insured from the
insurer does not negate a valid right existing against the collecting bank.
A majority of courts have allowed an insurer to be subrogated to the
rights of the insured only when the subrogee is deemed to have superior
equities over the defendant.1° Subrogation, often defined as a creature of
5 United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank in Dallas, 172 F.2d 258
(5th Cir. 1949) ; American Sur. Co. v. Bank of California, 133 F.2d 160 (9th Cir.
1943); Hensley-Johnson Motors v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 122 Cal. App.2d 22, 264 P.2d
973 (1953).
6 Grubnaw v. Centennial Nat'l Bank, 279 Pa. 501, 124 Atl. 142 (1924); Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank in Dallas, 151 Tex. 12, 245 S.W.2d 237 (1951).
7 Supra note 6.
8 United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v, First Nat'l Bank in Dallas, supra note 5.
Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Pellecchia, 15 N.J. 162, 104 A.2d 288 (1954);
Grubnaw v. Centennial Nat'l Bank, supra note 6.
10 American Sur. Co. v. Bank of California, supra note 5; National Sur. Co.
v. Arosin, 198 Fed. 605 (8th Cir. 1912); Meyer v. Bank of America Natl Trust & Say.
Ass'n, 11 Ca1.2d 92, 77 P.2d 1084 (1938); National Cas. Co. v. Caswell & Co., 317
Ill. App. 66, 45 N.E.2d 698 (1942); Louisville Trust Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 230
Ky. 482, 20 S.W.2d 71 (1929); Southern Sur. Co. v. Tessum, 178 Minn. 495, 228 NM.
326 (1929); Fidelity & Dep. Co. v. Atherton, 47 N.M. 443, 144 P.2d 157 (1944);
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equity, is said to be controlled exclusively by equitable principles, not-
withstanding the fact that the insured may have contractually assigned
its rights against the bank to the insurer. A minority of courts, as in the
instant case, disagree, contending that an assignment of the insured's
rights effects a conventional subrogation governed by legal principles."
This distinction, at best, is extremely weak and is not generally followed."
The rights of an employer's insurer against a defalcating employee are well
established in favor of allowing the insurer to recover the amount paid to
the insured." In such cases, the equities unquestionably run in favor of the
insurer. Where the subrogee, however, seeks to recover from a third party
alleged to be a mere innocent conduit in a check cashing transaction, the
law is not as well settled.
Under the majority view, recovery by the insurer against a collecting
bank has been refused for the reason that the insurer has received com-
pensation for assuming the risk and is therefore not possessed of superior
equities." The question of whether the third party is liable is not the
controlling determination, but rather the judgment as to which of two
innocent parties should bear the loss. Since the insurer is compensated for
assuming the risk the argument is made that it should not be allowed to
shift the loss to an allegedly innocent third party. Other courts have
pointed out that the argument fails to take into consideration that the
compensation for assuming the risk is based upon actual losses expected
to be sustained by the insurer." Also, the majority in effect permits the
collecting bank to benefit from an insurance contract for which it has paid
no premiums." If the bank has insurance of its own, its insurer will
therefore remain free of any claims arsing out of a risk that it may have
assumed. The numerous considerations in deciding which party has the
superior equities point up the inevitability of varied results depending
on what considerations a particular court may deem important.
The more recent decisions indicate an increasing willingness to allow
recovery by an insurer from a third party. In Standard Act. Ins. Co. v.
Pellecchia," the Supreme Court of New Jersey allowed the insurer to be
subrogated to the right of the employer bank against the collecting bank
United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Home Bank for Say., 77 W. Va. 665, 88 SR. 109
(1916).
11 First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta v. American Sur. Co., 71 Ga. App. 112, 30 S.E.2d
402 (1944) ; Grubnaw v. Centennial Nat'l Bank, supra note 6.
12 American Sur. Co. v. Bank of California, supra note 5; Meyer v. Bank of
America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, supra note 10; Louisville Trust Co. v. Royal Indem.
Co., supra note 10.
13 American Sur. Co. v. Robinson, 53 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1932) ; Louisville Trust Co.
v. Royal Indem. Co., supra note 10; Vance, Insurance § 134 (3rd ed. 1951).
14 CSC...5 cited note 10 supra.
• 15 Standard Ace. Ins. Co. v. Pellecchia, supra note 9.
10 In Grubnaw v. Centennial Nat'l Bank, 279 Pa. 501, 505, 124 Atl. 142, 143
(1924), the court said "it would be a novel proposition to hold that an insurance
contract could reach out to indemnify a stranger in no way a party to the insurance,
whose wrongful act caused the insurance company to pay the loss to the insured which
would not have occurred but for the wrongful act."
14 Supra note 9.
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on its express guarantee of prior endorsements. The court said that subro-
gation would be allowed as long as the conduct of the insurer and the
insured has not been such as to make the granting of relief unconscionable.
The decision, in parting from the majority view, emphasizes the legal
liability of the bank to the payee, and permits recovery without regard
to comparative equities. In a 1957 decision," the New Hampshire court
allowed an insurer to recover from a collecting bank on the ground that
the unauthorized payment by the bank caused its equities to be inferior
to those of the insurer. The facts of that case are not materially distinguish-
able from those in other cases holding that an unauthorized payment by a
bank is not enough to cause its equities to be inferior. The New Hampshire
court ruled that the defendant bank was liable for conversion by virtue
of a statute," and stated further that the defendant was not found negligent
or liable apart from said statute. It appears that the court based its
equitable finding on legal considerations and therefore found liability
to the insurer more in accordance with principles of law than with principles
of equity. In Aetna, the decision was based on strict legal principles as well
as on equitable principles which tends to indicate a strong willingness to
allow absolute subrogation to the rights of the insured. Since there is no
serious departure of results under legal principles from objectives of equity
and good conscience, it is submitted that a subrogee should stand on the
same footing as the subrogor, as was stated by the New Jersey court.2°
C. RONALD RUBLEY
Partnership—Existing Liability of Retired Partner—Effect of Indemni-
fication Agreement.—White v. Brown.' —White, one of three partners, re-
tired from a partnership under an indemnification agreement with the con-
tinuing partners. Three months later the creditor-appellee was notified of
both White's withdrawal and the indemnification agreement. A short time
thereafter the creditor accepted from the continuing partners twelve promis-
sory notes, each payable monthly for the principal sum of $2000 with interest
at six per cent. These notes were accepted on a debt of $20,659.27 which
was incurred by the partnership prior to White's retirement. The continuing
partners then became insolvent and the creditor sought payment of the
debt from White. The District Court directed a verdict for the creditor.
The retired partner appealed the decision, contending that the evidence
was sufficient to submit to the jury on the issue of an implied release agree-
ment. The appellant also maintained that from the evidence presented a
suretyship relation could have been inferred, and that the retired partner
as surety was discharged from liability on the debt when time for payment
was extended. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed
IS Security Fence Co. v. Manchester Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 101 N.H. 190,
136 A.2d 910 (1957).
10 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 337, H 21, 23 (1955).
20 Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Pellecchia, supra note 9.
292 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
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